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The Effects of Ownership on Bank Efficiency  
in Latin America 
 
Abstract 
In recent years many countries have privatized their state-owned banks and 
encouraged foreign investment. This paper investigates the roles of state and private 
ownership and foreign and domestic ownership on the performance of banks across 
Latin America. Using a range of financial and economic ratios, data envelopment 
analysis and regression modelling, the study reveals that by 2001 there was 
surprisingly little difference in performance between state-owned and privately-
owned banks and between foreign and domestically-owned banks. The study also 
reports significantly different levels of bank performance in different Latin American 
countries, suggesting that country differences outweighed ownership differences in 
explaining performance. 
JEL classification: G21, G32, N26 
Keywords: Latin America, banking efficiency, ownership, performance 
 
Page 1 of 47
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
2
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, the banking industry in Latin American countries has undergone 
significant reforms. Even though the speed of change has differed across Latin 
America, the process of financial market liberalization has been common to most of 
them1. The reforms have included the encouragement of foreign capital and the 
privatization of state-owned banks.  There has been an increase in the share of bank 
assets owned by foreign investors and a greater proportion of Latin American 
banking operated by the private sector. For example, according to Crystal et al. 
(2002), the foreign share of assets in Latin American banking has increased by 
between 20% and 50% during the last decade in most countries, becoming 
approximately 50% in Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela and almost 60% in Peru. 
The drivers of reform have included a desire to raise productivity, improve services 
and lower costs in financial services provision. 
In this paper the performance of foreign-owned versus domestically-owned and state-
owned versus privately-owned banks in Latin America are compared using cross-
sectional data for the year 2001, the latest date for which data were available at the 
time of the research. Latin America is defined widely to include South and Central 
America including the Caribbean. Ideally, we would also have liked to chart changes 
 
1 Cuba is the exception. It remains a centrally-planned economy. 
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in the performance of banks in Latin America under different forms of ownership 
during the 1990s. However, this proved not to be possible because of very incomplete 
data on ownership for years other than 2001. While a cross-sectional analysis of 
performance has limitations, since it does not reveal the dynamics of performance 
changes over time, nevertheless it does provide an insight into the results of reforms 
in ownership during the 1990s. If ownership change does lead to performance 
changes, we might expect to see obvious differences between state and privately-
owned banks and foreign versus domestically-owned banks by 2001.  
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 surveys the existing literature on 
foreign versus domestic and private versus state ownership and sets out the main 
research hypotheses which the literature generates on ownership and performance. 
Section 3 discusses the data and performance measures used and Section 4 reports the 
empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper and identifies the implications of the 
findings for future research. This paper contributes to knowledge by analyzing the 
efficiency of banks under different forms of ownership across a large region. In total 
20 Latin American countries are included in our sample. Also, a number of previous 
studies examining bank efficiency have not taken into account the environment in 
which they operate and this may be expected to impact on performance. In this study 
we attempt to control for macroeconomic conditions, industry structure and the legal, 
regulatory and governance context in which banks operate across Latin America. 
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2. Literature Review and the Research Hypotheses 
A number of studies have addressed the subject of efficiency in banking. Most have 
been country-level studies with many focusing on the US banking system. A number 
of these studies have emphasized the role played by better-quality management of 
resources in raising economic performance. For example, management of resources 
was found to be more important than scale and scope economies in determining bank 
performance by Berger (1993; also see Peristiani, 1996; Berger and Mester, 1997; 
Mukherjee et al., 2001; Barr et al., 2002; Akhigbe, 2002). By contrast, there have 
been relatively fewer studies concerned with cross-country analyses of bank 
efficiency (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Important exceptions are Allen and Rai 
(1996), who tested for input and output inefficiencies in 15 countries, and Altunbas et 
al. (2001), who modelled costs using a sample of EU countries.  More recently, 
Maudos et al. (2002) and Weill (2003) have also examined EU banking and cost and 
profit efficiency and Figueira et al. (2004) have compared the performance of Polish 
and UK banks.  
In particular, there appear to have been very few studies of the performance of banks 
in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. While Claessens and 
Glaessner (1998) compared profitability in banking in Asia and Kwan (2003) studied 
unit costs in banks in seven Asian countries, the majority of papers have tended to be 
mainly descriptive - setting out the kinds of reforms introduced into banking but with 
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very limited analysis of the performance results (Peek and Rosengren, 2001; Juan-
Ramón et al., 2001). Where econometric modelling has been applied, the literature 
lacks a direct comparison between the banking systems in each country and the 
region as a whole (Clarke et al., 2001; Fuentes and Vergara, 2003; Gruben and 
McComb, 2003; Majnoni et al., 2003, Mercan et al., 2003 and Unite and Sullivan, 
2003). 
As a consequence of deregulation and market liberalization, debate has emerged as to 
whether the ownership structure of financial institutions plays a significant role in 
determining efficiency (Unite and Sullivan, 2003; Fuentes and Vergara, 2003; Clarke 
et al., 2003; Kocenda and Svejnar, 2003; Barth et al., 2003, Koeva, 2003). A recent 
survey of a large number of privatization studies, covering a range of industries, 
concluded that privatization does lead to performance improvements (Megginson and 
Netter, 2001), but interestingly it reported only two studies specifically concerned 
with the banking sector. One by LaPorta et al. (2000) reported a negative impact of 
state ownership on the development of financial systems and economic growth, 
especially in poor countries. The other by Verbrugge et al. (2000) is concerned 
mainly with banking in OECD countries and finds some benefits from privatization in 
terms of profitability, fee income, capital adequacy and leverage ratios. More 
recently. Berger et al. (2003) also claim that privatization did improve bank 
performance in Argentinean banks, when profit efficiency is considered; however, 
they also found a lack of cost improvement. 
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The case for believing that private ownership is superior to state ownership in 
creating managerial incentives to raise productivity and lower costs of production is 
largely based on principal-agent theory and public choice theory (Clarke et al., 2005;
Beck et al., 2003). Under principal-agent theory, managers face greater incentives to 
pursue profit maximization strategies than managers in the state sector because the 
private capital market is a superior monitor of management behaviour than 
government departments (Hrovatin and UršiF, 2002; Rowthorn and Chang, 1993; 
Boycko et al., 1996; Ohlsson, 2003). Public choice theory is complementary, 
suggesting government ministers and civil servants pursue vote and budget 
maximization goals that lead to waste and other inefficiencies (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1994; Bartel and Harrison, 1999, Otchere and Chan, 2003). Therefore, the first 
hypothesis tested by the research is: 
Hypothesis 1: Banks in Latin America with private capital will operate more 
efficiently than banks mainly dependent on state capital. 
Some studies have suggested that where there is private capital but the state remains 
the dominant shareholder then efficiency incentives will be diminished (Otchere and 
Chan, 2003). However, Fama (1980) claims that managers of state-owned firms may 
wish to perform well, as a result of pressure from labour markets. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) also argue that managers’ behaviour is greatly influenced by the fact that 
residual claimants in state-owned firms may threaten to withdraw their resources if 
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not satisfied with the firm’s performance. Empirical studies which have reported a 
superior performance of state-owned banks over their private counterparts are 
Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) for commercial banks in India and Altunbas et al. (2001), 
who show that public German banks are slightly more cost and profit efficient than 
their private sector competitors. Perhaps the degree of state ownership is critical. 
Boardman and Vining (1989) reported in their study of 500 large non-US firms in 
1983 that firms with mixed share ownership, state and private, performed less well 
than firms with complete private ownership and no better than those that were purely 
state owned. Thus full private ownership is needed to gain maximum efficiency2.
This leads to the second research hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The performance of banks in Latin America will be affected by 
the degree of private investment. 
Turning to foreign ownership versus domestic ownership, Crystal et al. (2001) 
suggest that foreign ownership may contribute to the stability and development of 
developing countries’ banking industries, although Clarke et al. (2001) and Green et 
al. (2004) suggest that inefficiencies such as capital flight may also result. Sturm and 
 
2 When considering the impact of privatisation on bank efficiency, Nakane and Weintraub (2005) 
have also examined the different forms of privatisation. In their paper about bank privatisation and 
productivity in Brazil, they claim that straight privatisation appears to be a superior strategy to 
restructuring, followed by privatisation. 
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Williams (2004) examined the impact of foreign entry on bank efficiency in Australia 
and concluded that foreign banks are not necessarily more profitable. Moreover, 
Blomström and Kokko (1998) suggested that local firms may operate more efficiently 
due to two main factors: domestic firms have better knowledge of local markets and 
institutions (which may be conducive to their better performance) and, even when 
foreign firms have access to better technology, spillover effects can lead domestic 
firms to catch up over time. By contrast, a number of studies of economic 
transformation in transition economies have found that the entry of foreign capital 
leads to major performance gains and that these can be more significant than the 
gains from privatizations involving simply domestic investors (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 1999; Claessens et al., 2001; Kocenda and Svejnar, 2003). The reasons for 
believing that foreign investment will lead to performance improvements lies in the 
superior management skills that foreign investors can introduce, along with more 
commercially-oriented goals and international capital sources. Moreover, from the 
examination of the Mexican banking system, Haber and Musacchio (2005) concluded 
that foreign banks tend to be more profitable than domestically-owned banks because 
they are able to charge higher service fees3. This leads to hypothesis 3. 
 
3 Haber and Kantor (2003) went further and claimed that the lack of foreign entry at the outset of 
privatisation of banks in Mexico “proved fatal for the banking system” (p. 28), because banks tended 
to be undercapitalized and Mexican bankers had, generally, little bank management expertise. 
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Hypothesis 3: Latin American banks that are foreign owned will perform more 
efficiently than banks that are domestically owned. 
However, once again we might expect the degree of ownership to matter. In this case, 
we might expect that the larger the foreign investment is in a bank in relation to its 
total capital, the greater will be the efficiency gains introduced. Where foreign 
investors hold minority shareholdings their views could be overruled by domestic 
shareholders. Therefore, a further hypothesis tested in the research is: 
Hypothesis 4: The larger the share of foreign capital in the total capital of Latin 
American banks, the higher the resulting level of efficiency 
achieved.  
It should be noted at the outset that we recognize that the research has limitations. In 
particular, given that we use cross-sectional analysis, we are unable to comment upon 
changes in performance over time. Unfortunately, sufficient consistent data on 
ownership do not exist to undertake a meaningful time series or panel analysis.4 Also, 
our results could reflect sample bias. If the banks privatized were the best performers 
and therefore easiest to sell, and foreign investors cherry pick the best banks to invest 
in, then our results will be biased against a finding that state-owned and domestically-
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owned banks perform relatively well. Equally, if governments privatize their worst 
performing banks first to reduce the fiscal burden of financing losses, and banks try 
harder to attract foreign investors when in desperate need of recapitalization, then the 
alternative bias could result. The study could be biased in favour of finding that state-
owned and domestically-owned banks perform relatively well or as Green et al. 
(2004) comment: efficiency becomes “a pre-condition rather than the result of foreign 
entry”. These limitations need to be borne in mind when interpreting the results.  
 
3. The Data and Performance Measures 
We use data for 2001, the latest year for which we could obtain adequate detail on 
bank ownership in Latin America. The focus is on productive efficiency or costs of 
production. Data do not exist to discuss price-cost margins or service quality and 
therefore allocative efficiency.  
The data were drawn from the Bankscope data base, which contains balance sheet 
and income statement data published by the London-based International Bank Credit 
Analysis Ltd. A number of Latin American banks in the data base had to be excluded 
because of gaps in data, leaving a final sample of 204 banks in 20 countries. 
Moreover, the data required substantial editing, in order to avoid problems associated 
 
4 Some studies, e.g. Bonin et al. (2005) adopt a panel data analysis but using ownership data for only 
one year during the period covered. This approach we believe is flawed because ownership is not 
consistent over time in Latin America. 
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with double counting of institutions, to ensure consistent accounting standards and to 
ensure that non-bank financial institutions were excluded from the sample. As is 
argued in Bonin et al. (2005), data obtained from Bankscope need to be dealt with 
carefully in order to ensure that a reliable sample has been constructed. Nevertheless, 
the database has been used extensively in research into banking internationally 
(Altunbas et al., 2001; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Bonin et al., 2005) and can produce 
useful results, provided data entry is undertaken with care. 
In 2001, the total bank assets of the countries included in the study totalled 
approximately US$1,593 bn.. Our sample includes 40% of those assets, amounting to 
US$632 bn.. In terms of assets, therefore, it appears that our sample is sufficiently 
large to offer a fairly representative picture of performance in the Latin American 
banking sector as a whole, although not necessarily on relative performance in every 
country included. Table 1 provides details of the number of banks and the percentage 
of bank assets included in the study for each of the 20 countries5. The largest 
concentration of banks in the study is in Brazil (73 banks). The appendix provides a 
summary of descriptive statistics for the data used and the performance scores 
reported below. 
(Table 1 here.) 
 
5 Argentina was excluded from the study due to the fact that it was in a severe financial crisis in 2001 
and this could bias the results. Small Caribbean islands, such as Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, 
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Three sets of performance measures are reported. Previous performance studies have 
suggested that results can be sensitive to the performance measures used (e.g. Martin 
and Parker, 1997). By using three approaches to performance measurement, we are 
able to triangulate the results leading to more robust findings. The first set of 
performance measures is concerned with financial and economic ratios. The measures 
were chosen to reflect key banking metrics, namely operations, asset quality and 
capitalization ratios. A frequently used measure of performance in a market economy 
is profitability, because in a competitive market place profits reflect cost control as 
well as revenue maximization. Here we report three profit ratios: return on assets 
(ROA), interest rate spread (IRS)6 and net interest to total assets (NI/TA). Net interest 
is interest received less interest paid on deposits. However, profit is not an accurate 
measure of production efficiency where competition is imperfect and the banking 
sectors in Latin America, despite recent deregulation moves, are not necessarily 
highly competitive. Therefore, five other operations ratios were included, namely 
total costs in relation to output (TC/Y), personnel expenses over total costs (PE/TC), 
overheads over total assets (OV/TA), output to total assets (Y/TA) and operating 
income to total assets (OI/TA). Operating income differs from output by excluding 
interest income. Output was calculated by adding total loans to total other earning 
assets. In addition, the quality of bank assets was assessed using an asset quality ratio 
 
were also excluded because of the atypical environment in which their banks operate, dealing largely 
with international funds. 
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of loan loss provisions and other provisions to total assets (P/TA). Finally, the ratio of 
equity to total capital (E/TA) was calculated to reflect the soundness of a bank’s 
capitalization. 
In addition to the use of performance ratios, performance was assessed using data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Cost Frontier analysis (SCF).7 DEA was 
first proposed by Charnes et al. (1978) on the assumption of constant returns to scale 
(CRS). Banker et al. (1984) extended the DEA model to allow for variable returns to 
scale (VRS). DEA uses a piece-wise-linear technology, which involves mathematical 
programming to establish the efficiency frontier. The efficiency of each unit (e.g. 
bank) is then established by measuring its position in relation to this frontier. Assume 
that there are M inputs and S outputs, for each of N banks. The efficiency estimates 
can be obtained by solving the following DEA linear programming problem: 
Min ,  
subject to 
 0+ Yyi
6 The method to calculate interest rate spread was adopted from Unite and Sullivan (2003, p.2329) and 
involves calculating the difference between the ratio of interest income on loans to total loans and 
the ratio of interest expense on total deposits to total deposits. 
7 A translog cost function analysis was also estimated using restricted Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions, to allow for the influence of the cost share equations, derived from the Shepard’s 
lemma, as 
==
++=
= 2
1
3
1
)ln()ln(ln
ln
n
nin
j
jiji
i
i yww
CSH 	

 , where i = 1,2 and SHi denotes the two cost 
shares functions. The results obtained are in line with those obtained from the DEA and SCF 
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 0  Xxi
1' =NN (convexity constraint) 
 0 ,  is a scalar and NN is an Nx1 vector of ones. 
where xi is the column vector for the i-th bank in the MxN input matrix, X, and yi is 
the column vector for the same bank in the SxN output matrix, Y. The difference 
between the CRS and VRS formulations resides in the convexity constraint. While in 
a CRS model a bank may be benchmarked against banks of different size, in a VRS 
model an inefficient bank is only benchmarked against banks of similar size. 
Therefore,  weights will sum to a value that will usually differ from one. 
The DEA approach has the advantage over a stochastic cost function analysis in that 
it does not require the prior specification of the functional form. This can be 
important where the functional form may be expected to vary, perhaps, for example, 
for banks across Latin America. However, DEA has the disadvantage of attributing 
all deviations from the efficiency frontier to production inefficiency. If any noise is 
present in the data due to measurement error, this will affect the position of the 
frontier and, as a consequence, the measurement of inefficiencies. DEA results are 
also easily biased by outliers in the data because they too can affect the position of 
the frontier. 
 
analyses reported below. For reasons of space we do not report these results, but they can be 
obtained from the authors. 
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In this paper we concentrate mostly on the analysis of the cost structure of banks and 
therefore the DEA model presented uses an input orientation, where banks should 
minimize the use of inputs, given a certain amount of outputs produced. Only the 
VRS results are reported because we would expect banking to be subject to variable 
returns to scale – an expectation which is confirmed by our cost function results. 
A stochastic cost frontier (SCF) measure was also used because it does not have the 
same difficulties as DEA in terms of outliers and noise in the data (Battese and 
Coelli, 1995). This method uses statistical estimation in order to establish an 
efficiency frontier and, as a result, it provides the possibility to measure inefficiencies 
of firms which are away from the frontier. Using SCF, we consider that Total Costs 
are a function of the output (y), the price of inputs (w), the level of cost inefficiency in 
production (u) and a random part (v). The latter includes measurement error, random 
factors on the value of the output variables and the effects of unspecified input 
variables in the cost function (see Coelli et al, 1998). The terms u and v are 
considered to be multiplicatively separable from the other variables and the variables 
are expressed in logarithms. Therefore, the cost function can be represented as: 
 
vuwyfC lnln),(ln ++= . (1) 
Cost efficiency for an individual bank is the ratio between the minimum cost (Cmin)
necessary to achieve a desired level of output and the observed total cost (C) and can 
be written as:  
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The equation estimated in this paper is based on a flexible form of a translog cost 
function, as suggested by Casu and Girardone (2002)8 and can be described as: 
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(3) 
 
Restrictions of symmetry and linear homogeneity are imposed on the input prices. 
The variables included in the model are total cost, which includes financial and 
operating costs (C), input prices which include price of labour (w1), price of physical 
capital (w2) and price of loanable funds (w3), and quantity of outputs, described as 
loans (y1) and other earning assets (y2). 
Unlike DEA, however, SCF modelling requires a priori determination of the 
functional form and the distribution of the error term. Given that we use data from 20 
different Latin American countries (which may have different functional forms), we 
expected that this could cause some difficulty in the interpretation of the results 
derived. 
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4. The Empirical Results 
The performance ratios
Table 2 presents the financial and economic ratios with the results classified 
according to different levels of state and private as well as domestic and foreign 
ownership. To test hypotheses 1 and 2 above, relating to the effects of private 
ownership, we distinguished between banks which are totally privately owned; banks 
where the amount of assets owned by the state is less than 50% of the total assets; and 
banks where the majority of assets, at least 50%, are owned by the state. There were 
too few banks in each category for statistical analysis if we broke down state 
ownership into more discrete categories. 
(Table 2 here.) 
The Table also reports the results according to whether banks have some foreign 
capital and according to the degree of foreign investment, to test our research 
hypotheses 3 and 4. In the latter case, we distinguished between purely domestically-
owned banks; banks where the total amount of foreign-owned assets is less than 50% 
of the total; and banks with majority, at least 50%, foreign-ownership. 
In Table 2 average (av.) figures and standard deviations (s.d.) are given. The standard 
deviations confirm considerable dispersion of data amongst banks in the different 
 
8 The translog cost function is based on a flexible form production function that places few restrictions 
on the underlying production technology. It is, therefore, the most appropriate cost function to use 
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categories. Two-tailed t-tests were therefore undertaken to determine whether the 
difference between the means for each of the performance measures was statistically 
significant at the 10% level or better. 
Starting with the cost ratios, the results suggest that total costs to total output (TC/Y) 
are lower where there is some state ownership. The result is statistically significant 
for all levels of state ownership compared to private ownership. The results also 
confirm that there is no statistically significant differences in overheads to total assets 
(OV/TA) between privately-owned and state-owned banks, but personnel expenses to 
total costs (PE/TC) are higher in banks with majority state ownership. 
The ratio of output to total assets (Y/TA) can help provide information on banks’ 
revenues in the absence of data on bank pricing. As the results in Table 2 show, the 
ratio is higher in privately-owned banks than when banks are less than 50% state 
owned. In this case, these banks have an appreciably lower ratio than wholly 
privately-owned banks, suggesting that they are less effective in maximizing their 
revenues. However, there appear to be no statistically significant differences for this 
efficiency measure between privately-owned and majority state-owned firms. 
Concerning the ratio of operational income to total assets (OI/TA) and all of our 
profit measures, differences between state and private banks are not statistically 
significant. Therefore, we cannot conclude that these banks have substantially 
 
when studying firms that may have differing production technologies. 
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different performances in terms of generating operating income from their assets and 
profitability. 
Regarding the asset quality ratio, namely loan loss provisions and other provisions to 
total assets (P/TA), this was found to be the same in privately-owned banks and in 
banks with over 50% state ownership, though there was some evidence of a slight 
statistically significant difference between private banks and banks with minority 
state ownership. Concerning the capital ratio, equity to total assets (E/TA), the results 
in Table 2 suggest that banks which are minority state owned perform worse than 
banks which are either privately owned or have at least 50% state ownership and this 
difference is statistically significant. Therefore, the results suggest that banks which 
are minority state owned are under-capitalized compared with other banks. On 
balance, however, the performance ratio results in Table 2 suggest that comparing 
banks across Latin America, those that are privately owned do not perform obviously 
better than banks which have majority or minority state ownership. 
Table 2 also reports the performance ratios in terms of the degree of foreign 
ownership of banks. In terms of cost ratios, domestically-owned banks tend to have 
lower costs as a percentage of output produced and this difference is statistically 
significant when we compare domestic banks with banks that are at least 50% foreign 
owned. However, the latter have a statistically significant lower personnel expenses 
to total assets than domestic banks. The ratio of overheads to total assets is similar 
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between domestic and majority foreign-owned banks, but significantly higher in 
banks with minority foreign ownership. 
Concerning the revenue ratios, namely output to total assets (Y/TA) and operational 
income to total assets (OI/TA), and the profitability ratios return on assets (ROA), 
interest rate spread (IRS) and net interest to total assets (NI/TA), and the capital ratio 
(E/TA), differences between domestically-owned banks and banks with foreign 
ownership are not statistically significant. Regarding the quality of assets ratio – loan 
loss provisions and other provisions to total assets (P/TA) - the ratio for domestically-
owned banks is slightly lower than for banks which are less than 50% foreign owned 
but not compared to banks that are majority foreign owned. 
In summary, the performance ratios for domestically-owned versus foreign-owned 
banks are very similar, suggesting few differences in performance. It is possible, 
however, that our results for domestic and foreign ownership and state and private 
ownership mask important differences within each of the Latin American countries. 
Perhaps private ownership and foreign ownership have more obvious effects in some 
of the economies. To test for this, we computed the same performance ratios for a 
number of the countries separately. This could not be done for all of the countries 
because, as shown in Table 1, for some countries we have limited data. The countries 
considered were Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. The results obtained for each country were generally consistent with the 
pattern shown in Table 2 and described above – i.e. at the individual country level 
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there was also no strong evidence from the performance ratios that privately-owned 
banks performed differently to state-owned banks or domestically-owned to foreign-
owned banks in terms of costs, revenue, profitability, asset quality and capital ratios9.
The DEA and SCF results
As a cross-check on the conclusions from the performance ratios, the same data base 
was used to assess performance using DEA and SCF techniques. Table 3 provides a 
summary of the results obtained using DEA. The input variables consisted of labour 
costs, non-labour costs (total operational costs excluding personnel expenses), capital 
costs and interest expenses (to reflect the costs of raising loanable funds). The capital 
costs were proxied by calculating interest charges on total assets, using the deposit 
rate as the appropriate interest charge. The deposit rate was available for all 20 
countries unlike other interest rates that we might have used.10 The result is 
admittedly a crude capital input indicator and may not accurately reflect the 
opportunity cost of bank financing. However, it was the best proxy we could achieve 
with the available data. Two output variables were considered, namely loans and 
other earning assets. The results for both CRS and VRS DEA models were calculated 
and although we only report the VRS results, the pattern of results was consistent 
 
9 The detailed results can be obtained from the authors. 
10 The interest rate data were extracted from the IMF’s database, International Financial Statistics.
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using CRS modelling.11 The ownership categories for both state ownership and 
foreign ownership are the same as those that were used when analyzing the 
performance ratios, above.  
As the DEA results in Table 3 indicate, there is some suggestion that banks with 
some state ownership have a slightly higher average efficiency scores than banks 
which are entirely privately owned, but the differences are not statistically significant. 
Turning to the results for domestically-owned versus foreign-owned banks, there is 
statistical evidence (at the 10% level of confidence) that domestically-owned banks 
are more efficient than banks under majority foreign ownership. 
(Table 3 here.) 
Table 3 also provides a summary of the results using SCF analysis. The results are 
broadly consistent with the set of DEA results, but with higher overall efficiency 
scores (something to be expected given that SCF, unlike DEA, distinguishes 
inefficiency in production from random error). Again, there is no statistical evidence 
that state banks underperform in relation to their private counterparts. Also, domestic 
banks appear to perform better than banks with minority foreign ownership and this 
result is significant at the 5% level. 
 
11 The CRS results can be obtained from the authors. 
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The next stage of the study is an analysis of performance across countries. Table 4 
presents two sets of results, based on average DEA efficiency scores for banks in 
eight of the 20 countries in our sample12. These eight countries are the ones with the 
largest number of banks for which we have data. For the other countries, there were 
too few banks to carry out this stage of the statistical analysis. Firstly, the table shows 
how privately-owned banks perform in relation to state-owned banks, and how 
domestically-owned banks perform in relation to foreign-owned banks in the eight 
countries. Secondly, Table 4 also shows how bank performance differs across 
countries, by considering Brazilian banks as the benchmark.13 
From an examination of the results within each of the eight countries, we can 
conclude that there are no significant differences between banks which are majority 
state-owned and privately-owned banks. This conclusion is valid across all countries 
for which the comparison is possible14. Also, at the individual country level, 
domestically-owned banks seem to be more cost efficient than banks with at least 
50% foreign ownership in Chile and Colombia. 
Concerning bank performance differences across countries, banks in Chile, Jamaica 
and Uruguay tend to exhibit statistically different cost efficiency scores from 
 
12 SCF results are also available on this. However, as the results obtained provide generally similar 
conclusions to those obtained by DEA, they are not reported here. They are available from the 
authors at the reader’s request.  
13 Brazilian banks are used as a benchmark in the analysis due to the fact that Brazil is the biggest 
economy in Latin America. 
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Brazilian banks: Chilean banks seem to consistently outperform Brazilian banks in all 
the different ownership categories considered; while Jamaican and Uruguayan banks 
tend to exhibit noticeably lower performance than Brazilian banks irrespective of 
ownership. 
(Table 4 here.) 
The overall conclusion from the DEA analysis seems to be that at the aggregate, Latin 
American, level there are few statistically significant input-output performance 
differences across different ownership forms, but that at the individual country level 
some differences arise. This suggests that aggregating regional data conceals national 
variations. In order to investigate national effects further, the DEA efficiency scores 
were next regressed on a range of bank-specific and country-level environmental 
variables. Bank-specific variables were chosen to reflect the ownership structure, 
bank size and whether the bank is a specialized government credit institution. Beyond 
country dummies, country-level environmental variables were also used to indicate 
the size and strength of a country’s financial system (number of banks, the total 
amount of total assets in the banking system and the ratio of bank assets to national 
GDP); the level of competition in banking (the three and five firm concentration 
ratios and the Herfindhal index15 were used); and a number of macroeconomic 
 
14 In four out of the eight countries presented, the sample does not include banks which are at least 
50% state owned. 
15 These were computed from the Bankscope data and therefore correctly only reflect concentration 
within the sample of banks included. 
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indicators, because bank performance can be expected to be affected by the state of 
the economy (namely nominal GDP per capita, real GDP per capita, nominal GDP 
growth, real GDP growth and the inflation rate). However, only some of the country 
dummies and the Herfindahl index proved to be statistically significant and therefore 
only the results for these variables are reported.  
In addition, a number of regulatory governance variables were included to capture the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the regulatory environment, which may have a 
significant effect on the performance of banks. These measures were obtained from 
two different sources: the World Bank and the Heritage Foundation in association 
with the Wall Street Journal. Together they provide 16 possible indicators. These 
variables were initially included in this stage of the regression analysis, but most 
proved to be statistically insignificant. Table 5 presents a summary of the significant 
results using restricted ordinary least squares regressions, with the DEA and SCF 
efficiency scores as the dependent variable in each of the sets of estimated results 
presented and the environmental variables and governance indicators that proved to 
be statistically significant as the independent variables. The indicators that proved 
statistically significant are the informal market (reflecting services supplied in the 
informal economy), government intervention in the economy (which reflects, among 
other things, government consumption and production as a percentage of the 
economy and the extent of state control of businesses), regulatory quality (which 
takes into consideration the existence of policies that may hinder the operation of 
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markets), fiscal burden of government (which considers the top marginal income and 
corporate tax rates as well the change in the ratio of government expenditure to GDP) 
and voice and accountability (reflecting the political process, civil liberties and 
political rights). 
(Table 5 here.) 
The DEA results in Table 5 suggest that banks which operate in Brazil and Panama 
tend to exhibit higher cost efficiency. Moreover, the coefficient of the Herfindhal 
index is small but positive, meaning that banks which operate in a more competitive 
environment tend to be more cost efficient. Also, the informal market variable is 
negatively related to bank efficiency; that is, as more transactions take place in the 
informal economy bank performance is reduced. This result is consistent with the 
notion that banks operate better where economic transactions take place in the formal 
economy – informal economies tend to be predominantly cash based. Turning to the 
government intervention variable, the result suggests that the more government 
interferes with production and consumption in the economy, the less well banks 
perform. The significance of the regulatory quality variable suggests that the better 
the quality of regulation in a country, the more efficient are its banks. Moreover, the 
negative effect of the voice and accountability variable on bank efficiency suggests 
that a country with greater political stability, and where civil liberties and political 
rights are better protected, have more efficient banking. In this case a lower score 
equates with more favourable conditions because of the way the indicator is 
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computed. Finally, state ownership and foreign ownership were also included in the 
regressions as dummy variables. Both once again proved not to be statistically 
significant. This indicates that the regulatory and competitive environment in which 
banks operate was more important than a bank’s ownership structure in explaining 
performance variations across banks in Latin America in 200116.
The results obtained, using the SCF score as a dependent variable are generally 
consistent with the first set of results. In addition, the coefficients of two other 
country dummies are also positive and statistically significant – Colombia and 
Venezuela. The results also show that operating as a specialized government credit 
institution, on average, affects cost performance negatively. The variable fiscal 
burden of government also proved to be statistically significant. Not surprisingly, its 
coefficient is negative, denoting that that higher tax rates and government spending 
hinder the ability of businesses and individuals to pursue their objectives in the 
marketplace. Two variables have been excluded from the reported SCF results – the 
Herfindhal index and Regulatory Quality – because they were not statistically 
significant.17 
16 Country variables for Colombia and Panama and institutional variables for specialized governmental 
credit institutions and the fiscal burden of the government were included in an alternative regression 
but were statistically insignificant. These results are not reported. 
17 In both sets of estimated results, some of the variables have been excluded. They proved to be 
statistically insignificant in the initial estimation of the models and were therefore dropped. A 
restriction test on each set of estimation was carried out and confirmed the validity of the restrictions 
imposed. 
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The next step in our investigation was to re-run the earlier DEA and SCF models 
including the significant environmental and governance variables as inputs, given that 
they were shown to be correlated with bank efficiency. These results were consistent 
with the previous findings and neither private nor foreign ownership had a 
statistically significant effect on bank performance. For reasons of space we do not 
report these results in detail but they can be obtained from the authors.  
 
6. Conclusions 
This study has looked at the relative performance of state-owned and privately-owned 
and domestically-owned and foreign-owned banks across 20 Latin America countries, 
using cross-sectional data for 2001. Some previous studies (e.g. Megginson and 
Netter, 2001) have suggested that private ownership leads to improved production 
efficiency. Equally, other studies (Litan et al., 2001) have argued that foreign 
ownership can improve the management of assets in emerging economies. 
Triangulating the evidence using a set of commonly-used financial and economic 
performance ratios in banking, DEA and SCF analyses, the overall conclusion is that 
there is no strong evidence that privately-owned banks in Latin America performed 
better than their state-owned counterparts in 2001. However, there is some evidence 
that foreign-owned banks did not perform as well as their domestically-owned 
counterparts. The study also found that differences in performance were more related 
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to the national regulatory and economic environment and therefore to the country in 
which the banks operate than to ownership. 
Table 6 provides a summary of the results in terms of the four research hypotheses. In 
the main, none of our research hypotheses was supported. At the same time, we 
recognize that the study has some weaknesses. The Bankscope database was used in 
the absence of a better alternative source. The use of this database meant that, in 
particular, only a cross-sectional analysis could be undertaken because of a lack of 
ownership data for years other than 2001. This means that we were unable to trace the 
impact of ownership changes over time. This is important because, while there may 
be no robust performance differences between privately-owned and state-owned and 
domestically-owned and foreign-owned banks in 2001, it could be that private banks 
and foreign banks achieved the largest efficiency gains over the previous years. This 
would be so if the banks privatized and those sold to foreigners were banks with the 
worst performance. This needs further research. Another weakness relates to the 
limited number of banks that could be included in the study for some of the 20 
countries because of missing data. Perhaps the inclusion of more banks would have 
affected the results.  
Nevertheless, the research findings are important given the public policy agenda, 
promoted by international organizations such as the World Bank, to encourage 
privatization and foreign involvement in the Latin American economies (World Bank, 
1995; Saha and Parker, 2001). The findings do not suggest that improving bank 
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performance is simply a matter of changing ownership. Rather, the causes of bank 
performance seem to be found in wider economic and regulatory issues, although this 
needs much fuller investigation than has been possible in this paper. Future research 
could usefully focus on the macroeconomic and regulatory regimes necessary to 
promote maximum performance within Latin American banking. 
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Table 1: Data on the size and number of Latin American banks included in the 
sample 
 
Countries Total Assets 
(thousand US$) 
Sample Assets 
(thousand US$) 
Assets 
included (%) 
Total number 
of banks 
Belize 785,800 403,750 51 2 
Bolivia 4,663,309 3,136,530 67 5 
Brazil 616,241,990 452,701,344 73 73 
Chile 67,994,986 42,831,957 63 14 
Colombia 379,499,925 21,093,064 6 17 
Costa Rica 11,183,671 3,732,710 33 9 
Cuba 1,327,675 657,322 50 2 
Dominican Republic 14,869,316 1,720,636 12 3 
Ecuador 6,369,667 1,051,500 17 4 
El Salvador 9,738,165 3,848,600 40 4 
Guyana 349,881 295,040 84 2 
Honduras 3,691,461 1,021,171 28 3 
Jamaica 7,442,236 3,205,342 43 10 
Mexico 348,046,236 58,055,401 17 3 
Panama 41,085,644 10,672,615 26 14 
Paraguay 2,541,103 566,442 22 3 
Peru 22,686,336 13,290,635 59 11 
Suriname 227,326 225,314 99 2 
Uruguay 23,267,699 1,864,400 8 13 
Venezuela 30,715,535 11,710,518 38 10 
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Table 2: Performance ratios for the Latin American banks studied
Banks Total
Costs/
Output
(TC/Y)
Overheads/
Total
Assets
(OV/TA)
Personnel
Expenses/
Total
Costs
(PE/TC)
Output/
Total
Assets
(Y/TA)
Operational
Income/
Total Assets
(OI/TA)
Return
on Assets
(ROA)
Interest
Rate
Spread
(IRS)
Net
Interest/
Total
Assets
(NI/TA)
Loan Loss
Provisions/
Total Assets
(P/TA)
Equity/
Total
Assets
(E/TA)
av. (s.d.) av. (s.d.) av. (s.d.) av. (s.d.) av. (s.d.) av. (s.d.) av. (s.d.) av. (s.d.) av. (s.d.) av. (s.d.)
Private 0.35
(0.70)
0.06
(0.06)
0.15
(0.09)
0.85
(0.10)
0.10
(0.09)
1.88
(3.74)
0.26
(1.15)
0.07
(0.06)
0.02
(0.03)
0.16
(0.13)
Less than 50% state 0.18(0.07)***
0.06
(0.02)
0.23
(0.14)
0.77
(0.10)**
0.08
(0.04)
1.13
(1.94)
0.15
(0.13)
0.06
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)*
0.12
(0.06)*
50% or more state 0.21
(0.09)**
0.08
(0.05)
0.21
(0.14)**
0.84
(0.12)
0.10
(0.07)
-0.26
(6.11)
0.19
(0.39)
0.06
(0.07)
0.02
(0.03)
0.17
(0.13)
Domestic 0.19
(0.10)
0.06
(0.05)
0.17
(0.10)
0.85
(0.11)
0.10
(0.09)
2.01
(4.44)
0.31
(0.96)
0.07
(0.06)
0.01
(0.02)
0.17
(0.15)
Less than 50% foreign 0.25(0.18)
0.11
(0.11)*
0.17
(0.08)
0.84
(0.06)
0.14
(0.12)
0.62
(3.44)
0.18
(0.16)
0.09
(0.09)
0.03
(0.05)*
0.15
(0.12)
50% or more foreign 0.55
(1.01)***
0.06
(0.04)
0.14
(0.10)*
0.84
(0.11)
0.10
(0.07)
1.32
(3.74)
0.19
(1.35)
0.07
(0.05)
0.01
(0.02)
0.15
(0.12)
av – arithmetic mean, s.d. – standard deviation.
Significance at: ***1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level.
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Table 3: The DEA and SCF efficiency scores 
Banks Total no. DEA score SCF score 
av. (s.d.) av. (s.d.) 
All 202 58.26 (28.72) 80.19 (6.62) 
Private 171 58.06 (29.38) 80.24 (6.65) 
 Less than 50% state 7 60.65 (15.22) 81.18 (4.46) 
 50% or more state 24 58.95 (27.71) 79.59 (7.06) 
 Domestic 100 60.47 (27.89) 80.81 (6.64) 
 Less than 50% foreign 23 67.09 (23.22) 76.63 (8.43)** 
 50% or more foreign 79 52.88 (30.46)* 80.46 (5.70) 
av – arithmetic mean, s.d. – standard deviation; * significantly different from the DEA / SCF score for 
domestic ownership at 10% level of confidence; ** at 5% level of confidence. 
Page 43 of 47
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
44
Table 4: Efficiency scores of banks in selected Latin American countries, using DEA
Countries All Private ownership 50% or more state
ownership
Domestic ownership 50% or more foreign
ownership
Total
no.
DEA
score
100%
eff
Total
no.
DEA
score
100%
eff
Total
no.
DEA
score
100%
eff
Total
no.
DEA
score
100%
eff
Total
no.
DEA
score
100%
eff
av.
(s.d.)
% av.
(s.d.)
% av.
(s.d.)
% av.
(s.d.)
% av.
(s.d.)
%
Brazil 73 63.25
(26.84)
26.03 60 62.13
(27.31)
25.00 9 73.08
(26.75)
44.44 40 65.01
(26.85)
30.00 26 60.05
(28.89)
26.92
Chile 14 90.52(9.90)***
35.71 13 92.19
(7.99)***
38.46 0 - - 6 96.77
(3.72)***
50.00 5 83.58
(4.42)***†††
40.00
Colombia 17 53.82
(24.68)
11.76 10 49.95
(22.22)
0.00 7 59.35
(28.69)
28.57 11 59.54
(26.88)
18.18 4 39.38
(15.65)** †
0.00
Jamaica 10 47.82
(18.71)**
0.00 9 46.76
(19.52)**
0.00 1 57.32
(-)*
0.00 6 45.74
(13.94)***
0.00 3 46.21
(30.38)
0.00
Panama 14 74.22(25.19)
28.57 14 74.22
(25.19)
28.57 0 - - 4 82.75
(20.10)
25.00 10 70.81
(27.14)
30.00
Peru 11 60.35
(22.41)
9.09 7 61.27
(22.57)
14.29 4 40.6
(29.11)*
0.00 2 55.86
(40.95)
100.0 6 62.77
(24.34)
33.33
Uruguay 13 19.44
(24.76)***
7.69 13 19.44
(24.76)***
7.69 0 - - - - - 13 19.44
(24.76)***
7.69
Venezuela 10 52.28(26.18)
10.00 10 52.28
(26.18)
10.00 0 - - 7 54.40
(30.41)
14.29 3 47.33
(16.08)
0.00
av – arithmetic mean, s.d. – standard deviation;
Significance at: ***1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level in relation to Brazilian banks in each bank category;
Significance at: ††† 1% level, † 10% level in relation to domestic banks in each country.
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Table 5: Testing for the effects of environmental and 
governance factors 
Dependent variable bank DEA efficiency scores bank SCF efficiency scores 
coefficient coefficient 
Explanatory variables  
(all variables are in logs)
Constant 80.43 [6.30]*** 77.08 [19.69]*** 
State ownership -3.22 [-0.50] 0.82 [0.44] 
Foreign ownership -11.02 [-2.64]*** -0.31 [-0.30] 
Brazil 37.31 [6.05]*** 4.43 [2.37]** 
Colombia - 8.39 [2.76]*** 
Panama 50.55 [5.08]*** 5.84 [2.73]*** 
Venezuela - 7.99 [2.54]** 
Specialized governmental credit 
institution 
- -6.40 [-2.39]** 
Herfindahl index 0.01 [3.59]*** - 
Informal market -13.61 [-2.49]** -1.63 [-1.82]* 
Government Intervention -13.86 [-2.84]*** -5.29 [-2.90]*** 
Regulatory Quality 19.60 [2.82]*** - 
Fiscal Burden of the Government - -6.79 [-4.06]*** 
Voice and Accountability -40.03 [-6.08]*** 8.07 [3.73]*** 
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.09 
F-stat 4.43*** 2.77*** 
DW 1.87 1.98 
Heteroskedasticity 32 1.41 1.72 
Significance at: ***1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level
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Table 6: Summary of the results in terms of the research hypotheses 
Hypotheses Performance 
Ratios 
DEA SCF 
Hypothesis 1: 
Banks with private capital will operate 
more efficiently than banks mainly 
dependent on state capital 
Mainly 
rejected 
Rejected Rejected 
Hypothesis 2: 
The performance of banks will be affected 
by the degree of private investment 
Mainly     
rejected 
Rejected Rejected 
Hypothesis 3: 
Banks with foreign investors will perform 
more efficiently than banks with only 
domestic investors. 
Mainly 
Rejected 
Rejected Rejected 
Hypothesis 4: 
The larger the share of foreign capital in 
the total capital of banks, the higher the 
resulting level of efficiency achieved. 
 
Rejected Rejected Mainly 
rejected 
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Appendix: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Total Costs/Output 0.33 0.18 0.65 0.02 4.19 
Overheads/Total Assets 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.42 
Personnel Expenses/Total Costs 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.01 0.50 
Output/Total Assets 0.84 0.87 0.11 0.49 1.00 
Operational Income/Total Assets 0.10 0.08 0.09 -0.03 0.68 
Return on Assets 1.58 1.44 4.58 -26.39 20.80 
Interest Rate Spread 0.25 0.12 1.07 -6.24 8.77 
Net Interest/Total Assets 0.07 0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.40 
Loan Loss Provisions/Total Assets 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.26 
Equity/Total Assets 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.98 
Loans 1287565 242202 3867937 1 36201388 
Other Earning Assets 1318617 139257 4329080 16 36717289 
Labour Costs 75592 8762 267987 48 2431046 
Non Labour Costs 103172 11501 339657 1 2558654 
Interest Costs 291068 46738 831211 22 5619635 
Capital Costs 201815 9922 792005 1 9914373 
DEA score 58.26 54.29 28.72 3.91 100.0 
Price of Labour 10.90 2.84 16.78 0.01 87.84 
Price of Capital 4.72 0.18 5.35 0.06 16.22 
Price of Deposits 1.32 0.10 14.96 0.02 212.60 
SCF score 80.19 81.09 6.62 50.90 94.11 
Herfindhal index 892.81 521.49 799.25 465.37 6425.37 
Informal market 3.39 3.50 0.64 1.50 5.00 
Government intervention 2.73 3.00 0.47 1.00 4.00 
Regulatory Quality 0.47 0.36 0.49 -0.96 1.35 
Voice and Accountability 0.41 0.53 0.47 -0.59 1.31 
Fiscal Burden of the Government 2.91 2.50 0.62 1.50 4.50 
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